On a fairly traditional -and, perhaps, fairly 'platitudinous' 1 -understanding of its nature, truth seems to be something that should merit the label of being 'Janus-faced'. This is because truth appears to be something that points at the same time, and seemingly with equal necessity, toward both objects and subjects. On the one hand, the notion of truth seems to involve the notion of objectivity. If something is true, then (aside, perhaps, from certain cases, e.g., involving self-reference) it is true whether we (subjects) like it or not, regardless of whether we think (believe, take) it to be true. What makes things true are simply the facts of the matter. On the other hand, the notion of truth also seems to involve an intrinsic connection to the notion of subjectivity -more specifically to the mental and linguistic activity of thinking, speaking subjects. This connection shows itself in two ways:
This traditional conception is more or less encapsulated in what, for a long while, has served as the core definition of truth: 'truth is the agreement of our thoughts with their objects' -'veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus', as Aquinas puts it.
2 To be sure, not everyone has accepted that all three of these aspects (relation to objective facts (res), standard for correctness (adaequatio), and relation to acts of representing by subjects (intellectus)) must be incorporated into the analysis of truth. Even so, philosophical accounts of truth that leave no room for, or cannot do justice to, one or another of these aspects are often, and for this reason, viewed with a certain amount of suspicion.
Almost immediately after it burst on the scene, Kant's idealism has come in for just such a criticism. In particular, it is often worried that Kant's views will eliminate a place for the first two features of truth identified above. In Kant's hands, idealism consists in the belief in the mind-or representation-dependence of certain aspects of the sensible world. But then, to the extent that what allegedly makes our representations of these aspects true is now a function of these representations themselves, idealism seems to imply, first, that our representing something to be so is itself responsible for its being so, and secondly, and correlatively, that there is no possibility for us to be mistaken in our representation of these aspects, since there is no further way that these aspects are 'in themselves' above and beyond how we represent them as being, such that we could represent them falsely, or in a way in which they, in fact, were not. Now, as we will see below ( §2), Kant himself did not think that his views required giving up on the traditional definition of truth. Yet as will also emerge, many of Kant's successors were not convinced. Rather, it was by focusing even more intensely upon the nature of truth that several of them hoped to avoid the 'subjectivizing' pitfalls of Kantian idealism. Bolzano, for example, turned his attention to the development of a revolutionary account of the bearers of truth (cf., §3); Brentano sought to shift the center of the discussion of truth toward a renewed and influential emphasis on our real experiences of correctness as definitive of truth ( §4); and Husserl hoped to supplement both Bolzano and Brentano's analyses with a more direct and sustained analysis of the nature of truth-makers themselves ( §5).
In the process, these 19 th century theorists cast a critical spotlight upon each of the three dimensions noted above. The cumulative result was the cultivation of a dynamic philosophical context in which many of the key issues still at the heart of contemporary debates about truth were first identified as pivotal. Indeed, it brought about the very context in which the origins of two of the most influential movements in 20 th century philosophyanalytic philosophy and phenomenology -find their roots. For this reason, even if thinking through the problems and prospects that emerge in this development does not, of itself, provide a complete resolution to these debates, it promises to provide us with both deeper clarity concerning these issues as well as a richer sense of the historical motivations for certain now-familiar theoretical twists and turns.
§2. Kant and the truth in appearances
Aquinas's definition was endorsed repeatedly throughout the early modern period, up till the time of Kant. We find it, for example, in Descartes, Spinoza, and 4 This suggests that Kant does not take himself to be putting forward a deeply revisionary or heterodox theory of truth, despite his clear sense that he is up to something revolutionary within theoretical philosophy, and despite his other radical departures from the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition. Even so, the threat to the familiar conception of truth becomes readily apparent once we look more carefully at Kant's own understanding of the three key terms in the traditional definition, especially his understanding of 'object'.
Concerning 'cognition': though Kant above makes it sound as if truth can pertain to any species of cognition, Kant's considered view is that truth is restricted to judgments: 'truth as well as error…is to be found only in judgments' (B350). Judgments, like all cognitions, are a species of 'representation [Vorstellung]', which means that a judgment is a mental act that is related to an object. Judgments are distinguished by being acts of our capacity for understanding -i.e., our 'intellect' -acts, in particular, that involve the kind of synthesis or 'combination [Verbindung] ' of further cognitions that is expressed by the copula 'is' (cf., B141). For a dissenting interpretation of Kant's 'acceptance' of the tradition definition in this passage, see (Prauss 1969) . In this essay, I will cite major works parenthetically, according to the abbreviations provided in the Bibliography. For Kant, I will cite the first Critique according to the B-edition pagination, and will cite the Prolegomena ('Prol.') and Jäsche's Logic ('JL') according to the Akademie Ausgabe volume and page numbers (cf. Kant 1902-) . For Brentano and Husserl, I will cite according to pagination from the English translation (where available) followed by that of the German edition. In all cases, the translations are my own, though I have consulted (and especially in the case of Kant's works, usually followed) the standard English translations, where possible (see Bibliography). 5 It is worth noting that, unlike Frege, 'judging' for Kant is not equivalent to 'holding-for-true [Fürwahrhalten] ' (cf. JL §IX, 9:65f). Kant takes the act of judging to form a representation (a judgment) that is true or false (in the case of theoretical judgments), and which can then also be held to be true or false (in a separate act), but need not be.
Turning to 'agreement', we can note, first, that the particular representational 'relation' that a given cognition bears to its object is what Kant calls the 'content [Inhalt] ' of the cognition (B79; cf., B83). Kant takes the agreement (and its opposite, the 'contradiction') between a cognition and its object to be a further specification of this relation, such that a particular cognition's agreement with its object -i.e., its truth -is something that 'pertains precisely to content' (cf., B83-4). 6 In this respect, truth, for Kant, is primarily a semantical notion, as it concerns the representational relation between acts and objects, in virtue of their content. This contrasts with the more 'metaphysical' view of truth, also anticipated in Aquinas, and put forward by some of the Leibnizians, according to which truth is a property of objects themselves. 7 Kant explicitly rejects any conception that would make truth a 'transcendental predicate of things', rather than a property of our 'cognition of things' (B113-14).
So far, so traditional. Things become considerably more complex, however, once we take a closer look at Kant's mature conception of the third notion in the above definition of truth: the 'object [Gegenstand] ' to which our cognition 'agrees' when it is true. For what Kant says about the objects of our cognitions threatens to eliminate their representationindependence altogether. Yet without this link to genuine objectivity, Kant's views might seem to become deeply revisionary indeed.
Kant's 'Copernican' revolution comes about with his questioning of a commonlyheld assumption about the relation between our cognition and the objects of our cognition, with the hope that rejecting this assumption will allow us to finally make decisive progress in metaphysics. As he writes in the Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason:
6 As he puts it later in the Critique: truth 'is to be found…only in the relation of objects to our understanding' (B350; my ital. (Künne 2003: 104) .
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects [sich richten nach den Gegenständen]; but all attempts to find out something about them apriori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an apriori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. (Bxvi; my ital.)
The first Critique is Kant's attempt to explore and vindicate this inversion of the common assumption, with Kant's conclusion being that the only metaphysical, apriori cognition that is possible is, in fact, of objects that 'conform' to our cognition.
Along the way, however, Kant's views about metaphysical cognition turn out to be intertwined with his account of cognition in general, whether metaphysical (apriori) or otherwise. The core of Kant's argument about metaphysical cognition lies in his belief that the only thing that our minds can be thought to have apriori access to, the only thing 'given and present' to the mind apriori, is the mind itself, its own structure, and its two basic capacities for representing -'the constitution of our capacity for intuition' (our sensibility) and the 'rules' for our understanding as a capacity for thinking and judging -since all of these are things that lie 'in myself before any object is given to me' (Bxvii; cf., Prol §9, 4:282).
Yet precisely because our apriori cognition is limited in this way, the only information that such cognition can convey about objects is that any object represented by these capacities will be represented in the forms that representations from these capacities must take, due to the nature of the capacities themselves. In this way, our apriori cognition of objects is restricted to knowledge about whatever representations of objects can 'conform' to our capacities for cognition, rather than extending to cognition of these objects as they are 'in themselves'.
The consequences for our cognition in general emerge once Kant begins to spell out what we know apriori about our mind. In particular, Kant thinks we know that an object can only be 'given' to us in intuition if our mind's sensibility is 'affected' by it, such that we 'sense' it in some way or other, with the effect of this affection being that the object is able to 'appear' to us (B33). But we also know apriori that any representation (intuition) from our sensibility must 'conform' to the way that this capacity represents things. For this reason, the appearance of an object in an intuition can only take place in a representation that will inevitably bear the marks of having been produced by our mental capacities. Even so, the universal and necessary presence of these marks in the appearance -what Kant calls 'the forms of appearance', and what he identifies with the spatial relations and temporal orderings that organize the contents given in our sensations -is something that we know is present due to the nature of our minds rather than the nature of the affecting objects (B34). Now, Kant thinks that, aposteriori, it is ultimately the appearances of objects that are 'the only objects that can be given to us immediately' (A108-9; my ital.). These 'objects', however, are not really genuine self-standing things in their own right, since they are not a way something could be 'in itself', but are instead 'representations' of things (A109). But then, because an appearance exists only as a 'way of perceiving' or 'representing' something else, Kant claims that it only exists 'in us', or at the very least, only in the relation between the object and our minds (B59; cf. Prol. §52c, 4:341).
With this further claim, Kant can seem to straightforwardly threaten the mindindependence of the possible objects of our cognition in general, for the following reasons. If the only object that can be immediately present to us apriori is the mind itself (and its capacities), and the only things that can be immediately present aposteriori are appearances, and if the only things we can have knowledge of are things we can have immediately present before our minds, then our cognition, in general, will be 'restricted' or 'limited' to the mind and of appearances. But since appearances are objects whose forms are supplied by our minds, then our cognition is, in general, restricted to objects that, in a very straightforward sense, must 'conform' to our capacities for cognition, since they are either these capacities themselves or a 'product' of them (Prol §20, 4:300).
With this we see why Kant's revolutionary account of our cognition and its objects can seem to have no grounds for retaining anything like the traditional notion of truth, and more specifically, the distinction between truth and falsity -Kant's own assent to the traditional definition notwithstanding. On the traditional picture of conformity or agreement of our representations with their objects, the former entities are beholden to the latter: the way objects actually are makes certain representations of them true, and the fact that we can represent objects otherwise than how they actually are makes falsity possible.
On Kant's new picture, however, the objects of possible cognition are now beholden to our mental acts, as something of the mind's own making, as merely 'ideal' rather than 'real' (cf.,
B66
). Yet with this inversion, the possibility of gaps between a putative object of knowledge being a certain way and its being represented as being that way can seem to have disappeared.
The fact that our representations 'produce' their immediate objects means that these objects simply do not have the sort of existence that outstrips their being represented; as Kant says repeatedly, they are nothing outside of their being represented. But then a conformity or agreement between cognition and object would seem to be guaranteed, universally and necessarily, and all of our intuitions (representations of appearances) would become trivially true.
At this point, however, Kant can insist that his position is being mischaracterized in two important respects. The first has to do with the nature of appearances. It is not every feature of appearances that is said to 'lie in the mind' apriori, but rather only their form; this is part of why Kant thinks a better name for his idealism would be 'formal idealism' (Prol. What is more, Kant himself concedes that the 'agreement' of the products of a capacity for representation with the basic constitution of the capacity itself could achieve only 'the form of truth', rather than full-blooded truth, since the complete cognition (form plus matter) could, at least in principle, still go on to 'contradict' its object (B84). Hence
Kant himself would admit that the mere 'agreement' of appearances with the forms of cognition is at best a merely 'formal truth', since this, in effect, 'consists in the agreement of a cognition with itself' (JL §VII, 9:51; my ital.). This contrasts with genuinely 'objective truth', which requires the 'matter' of the appearance, too, to 'agree' with its object (ibid.).
This first appeal, however, can seem to only help so much. For one thing, Kant takes contents of sensations themselves to also be contained 'in' the appearance, and hence also immediately present to the mind in a way that the object affecting us is not. This leaves opaque the exact relation between these contents and whatever features of the object of the appearance they are representing.
Equally problematic is Kant's thesis that 'all the properties that make up the intuition of [an object] belong merely to its appearance ' (Prol., 4:289; my ital.) . This suggests that even the sensory qualities that fill in the forms supplied by the mind -even this matter is ultimately something that belongs merely to the appearance of things. But if these material features of appearances are likewise things that do not exist outside of being represented, then they don't actually seem to possess the requisite representation-independence to function as facts that can constrain our representations to make them true.
Here, however, we must recall that Kant does not think that appearances are themselves actually the genuine bearers of truth and falsity. As we saw above, this title belongs instead to our judgments: 'truth and illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited' -i.e., in its appearance -'but in the judgment about it, insofar as it is thought' (B350). It is, therefore, only in judgments concerning appearances that any questions of agreement in the sense of truth arise.
What is more, Kant thinks we are able to make true judgments about the status of the appearances, judgments whose contents 'agree' or conform exactly to the way their objects actually are:
[I]f I take all the [sensible] representations together with their form -namely, space and time -for nothing but appearances, and these last two for a mere form of sensibility that is by no means to be found outside it in the objects…then in the fact that I take them for mere appearances is contained not the least illusion or temptation for error…. (Prol. 4:291) We can make true judgments about appearances whenever we say exactly what Kant himself says about them and therefore we 'take [halten] ' them for what they really are -namely, appearances. Here the object of our judgment (appearance) is just as we are representing it to be in our judgment. Furthermore, at this point, Kant thinks that error is clearly possible;
indeed, many metaphysicians prior to Kant wrongly 'take' what belongs to the appearance of an object to belong instead to the object itself, and in this way 'make mere representations into things ' (Prol. 4:293) .
Actually, Kant thinks we do even more than simply 'taking' or 'holding' appearances
'for' what they really are. This is something he makes clear in the following important footnote in the Transcendental Aesthetic:
The predicates of appearance can be attributed to the object in itself in relation to our sense, e.g., the red color or fragrance to the rose…. What is not to be encountered in the object in itself at all, but is always to be encountered in its relation to the subject and is inseparable from the representation of the object, is appearance, and thus the predicates of space and of time are rightly attributed to the objects of the senses as such, and there is no illusion in this. On the contrary, if I attribute the redness to the rose in itself…or extension to all outer objects in themselves, without looking to a determinate relation of these objects to the subject and limiting my judgment to this, then illusion first arises. (B69-70n; my ital.)
Above and beyond simply (and correctly) ascribing the property being an appearance to the immediate object of our intuition, we can also correctly ascribe the 'predicates' that are contained 'in' the appearance itself -i.e., all of the 'properties that make up an intuition' (to recall a passage cited above) -not to the object as it is in itself, but instead to the object in relation to our capacity for sensing it. What is represented in these more sophisticated judgments will also be able to 'agree' with their 'object' because their object is now the complex: object-in-relation-to-my-sensibility; and we can see straightaway (thinks Kant) that this 'object' is just as it appears to be.
With this, Kant would seem to have escaped the worst of the difficulties posed above. Since the object of the judgment is not dependent for its existence on the judging itself, it enjoys a form of relative representation-independence (i.e., relative to judging, even if not relative to intuiting). This, moreover, also opens up space for our judgments to misrepresent these objects, since we are 'entirely free' to 'take' them to be something other than they actually are, as when we take them to be, or contain properties of, things in themselves (cf., Prol. 4:290).
Yet however much is clearly gained for Kant's position by returning our focus to judgment rather than appearance, this shift brings with it a further difficulty -a problem, moreover, that is perhaps the deepest yet encountered. Recall that judgments arise through acts of combination, combination that is expressed by the copula 'is'. Now, Kant takes this combination to be the result of an 'act [Actus]' of our capacity for understanding, something 'executed by the subject itself' out of its 'spontaneity' or 'self-activity [Selbsttätigkeit]' (B130).
Importantly, for Kant, this means that such combination is a feature of our representations that 'can never come to us through the senses' (B129; my ital.) and 'is not given through objects'; rather, Kant thinks we 'cannot represent something as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves' via our understanding (B130; my ital.).
From this, however, it would seem to follow that the combinatory form of what is represented in judgment is not a feature that tracks anything either in the objects as they are 'in themselves' or -and this is the crucial point -'in' objects as they appear. For, just as the fact that spatial relations and temporal order are put into intuitions by the exercise of our sensible capacity implies that they are not representative of something present in the object 'in itself', so too should the fact that predicative combination is put into our judgmentrepresentations only by acts of our conceptual capacity (understanding) entail that it is not representative of something present in the object of the judgment (the thing in relation to my sensibility through intuition (appearance)). But then if we know that the very form that judgment must take is not something that will 'agree' with any object -either objects as they are in themselves, or objects as they appear (appearances) -all routes would seem to be blocked for making the case that what is represented in the judgment, as a whole, could somehow stand in agreement with -and hence, be 'true' of -either of these objects nevertheless. And, a fortiori, it is unclear what it would mean for us to claim to 'see' this agreement or have evidence for taking it to obtain (and so for holding a judgment to be true). for use in telling which judgments are true. Knowledge of such agreement would just be the knowledge of the truth of the judgment, rather than an apprehension of a mark that could then be used as a sure sign for taking something to be true (cf., JL §VII, 9:50). In fact, Kant accepts that the only criterion that we have for holding a judgment to be true, prior to knowing it to be true (to 'agree'), is the internal 'coherence [Zusammenstimmung]' of our claims about what appears with our other claims about appearances (B179; cf., Prol. 4:290). At one point Kant even seems to accept that such coherence is a 'sufficient mark' for truth relative to appearances (B679; my ital.). For interpretations which claim that Kant already means to embrace a more coherentist definition (rather than criterion) of truth, see (Windelband 1884), (Kemp Smith 1918), and (Walker 1989) . For a discussion of the difficulties facing this sort of reading, see (Van Cleve 1999) . 9 Cf (Hegel 1812: Introduction) ; for some discussion of Hölderlin, see (Henrich 1997). rejects the application of the property of being true directly to objects, simply in virtue of their being or existing; this sense of 'truth' Bolzano also calls 'transcendent' or 'metaphysical', as opposed to its genuine 'logical' sense, which is linked to judgments (WL §27, I.118f). Yet
Bolzano also thinks that describing the bearer of truth as a kind of representation tends to cover over an important ambiguity in the term 'representation' itself -namely, the ambiguity between its picking out the act of representing and its picking out the content contained in such acts. In fact, Bolzano takes the failure to 'distinguish sharply enough' between the act and the content of our representations to be 'the source of most of the current errors in logic' -Kant's included (WL §12, I.47).
Even if (as we saw above) Kant had noted that acts of cognition possess a content, construed as a representational relation to an object, in addition to this object itself, Bolzano thinks Kant did not do nearly enough to clarify this distinction, nor did he undertake any sustained investigation of the nature of these contents directly. What such investigations show is that the contents of our representings possess an identity that is independent of the reality of any one of these acts. The very same content can be taken up in multiple acts at multiple times (without itself being 'multiplied') or might never be thought of or grasped by anyone at all -save, perhaps, by God (WL §48, I.217-18). But then such contents can in no way be products, effects, or creations of these acts either (cf CE 115; 32 and CE 142; 63).
Consequently, Bolzano thinks we should regiment our terminology and speak of 'subjective representation' when we mean to pick out real mental acts that exist in some subject, and use 'objective representation' or 'representation in itself [an sich]' when we mean to pick out the act-independent self-identical content (or 'matter [Stoff]'), which is 'not something existing'
and 'is not to be found in the realm of the actual' (WL §48, I.217).
Bolzano takes this threefold distinction between act, content ('matter'), and object to apply at the level of judgments as well. Here he introduces the terms 'objective proposition propositions have an identity that is distinct in kind from the acts in which they are grasped, and they are not brought into being by any act of mind either. In these respects, Bolzanian
propositions are closer kin to Fregean 'thoughts [Gedanken]' than they are to Russell's propositions.
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With this in mind, Bolzano argues that the genuine bearer of the 'property
[Beschaffenheit]' of truth must be the objective content of such an act -i.e., the proposition -rather than the (subjective, real) act of judgment (WL §24, I.108). Though this partially echoes Kant, Bolzano distances himself from Kant by insisting that the content of a judgment itself is not something that is 'combined' or put together by any 'act' (spontaneous or otherwise); rather, any combination that is present in a proposition is present in this content 'in itself', as it were.
Still, Bolzano does accept that propositional content contains a combination of sorts.
Bolzano takes every proposition to consist in three parts: a subject-representation which represents an object, a predicate-representation which represents a 'property representations) must be distinguished from the 'objects' to which they are 'related'
representationally (cf., WL §49, I.218f). 13 What Bolzano explicitly identifies as the 'object
[Gegenstand]' of a proposition as a whole, however, is simply the object of the subjectrepresentation of the proposition; at certain points, Bolzano even calls the subjectrepresentation simply the 'object-representation' (cf., WL §126, II.8).
14 Yet Bolzano clearly accepts that there is more that is being represented 'in' a proposition than simply the object.
Recall that, for Bolzano, propositions possess the following kind of structure: A has b.
Hence, there is not only the subject-representation, but also the predicate-representation that 12 In the note to WL §32, for example, Bolzano distinguishes between the proposition 'A is B', and 'the proposition, that A is B, is true', on the grounds that the latter 'is a different one according to its component parts, and thus a second truth distinct from the first' (I.147). At the very least, the two propositions have different subject-terms: for any proposition 'A', 'we find that the proposition expressed by the words 'A is true' is one distinct from the proposition 'A' itself, since the former obviously has a completely different subject from the latter. Its subject is, namely, the complete proposition 'A' itself' (Bolzano 1851: §13, 13). This is so, despite the fact that, as Bolzano acknowledges, 'if the proposition 'A is B' is true, then so too the assertion 'the proposition, that A is B, is true' a true proposition' (WL §32, I.147) -i.e., despite the fact that the semantical predication itself follows from the truth of the original proposition. 13 Bolzano thinks that, in every case, a content must be distinguished from the object that it represents, both because distinct contents can represent the same object, and because -as is especially evident in cases when the object is something really existent -the content and its object bear obviously distinct properties (WL §49, I.219). 14 In a similar fashion, Bolzano identifies the 'extension [Umfang]' of a proposition as a whole with the extension of the subject-representation (cf., WL §130, II.25).
represents a property, and, in addition, the copula or 'linking part' or 'linking member' that 'indicates [anzeigt] that the object has the given property' (WL §126, II.8-9).
Now, if what the whole proposition were to be coordinated with was simply the object of its subject-representation, then this would seem to make the rest of the propositional representation superfluous for its truth, since the relevant coordination would have already been taken care of simply by the subject-representation itself. What the proposition as a whole seems to aim to coordinate with, then, is instead something like the fact that A has b, or the having-b of A. That Bolzano is angling for such a view would seem to be further encouraged by the willingness we saw above to identify b's (actually) 'pertaining to' A as that which is coordinated with b's being predicated or 'asserted of' A in the proposition, when that proposition is true.
The problem with crediting Bolzano this line of analysis, however, is that, like Kant, For Bolzano, then, the only significance of the copula would seem to be its senseconferring role of 'linking' the other representations into something that has the form of a proposition. Rather than itself representing any object or property, the purpose of the representation expressed by 'has' appears to be fulfilled entirely internally to the economy of representations, by serving to 'combine [verbinden] ' the other (objective) representations.
Yet if its presence in a proposition is not demanded of it by its object, then why is the combination present in the proposition, in the sphere of representations, in the first place?
The traditional answer up through Kant was that such combination is present in the bearers of truth, not because of the objects, but as a result of mental activity. 16 Now, as we saw above, this also implied that the copula does not have an objective correlate (and is hence 'gegenstandslos'). Indeed, it was precisely this feature of the view that posed an obstacle to analyzing truth as an agreement between contents of judgments and the things represented. To be sure, this act-theoretic account of the significance of the copula is unavailable for Bolzano, since he denies that combination is present in propositions as the result of mental activity. But then, by rejecting both the mind-dependence of propositions an sich (or their forms), as well as any account on which their form is made to order, as it were, as a result of something 'in' their objects, Bolzano appears to leave us with no explanation whatsoever of the distinctive unity and structure of propositions.
Furthermore, by accepting the presence of representational content in propositions (and hence, in truths themselves) that in no way tracks the way objects themselves are an sich, it is hard to see how Bolzano's account will be able avoid re-introducing Kant's 'subjectivizing' distinction between the way that objects 'appear' to us -even if now in 'objective' propositions 'in themselves' -and the way they (the objects) are 'in themselves'. propositional 'appearance' of an object. So long as this gap remains, Bolzano's account of propositions, and therefore truths, threatens to leave us one step short of the facts, and therefore to eliminate the intelligibility of the first aspect of the traditional notion of truth identified above -namely, truth's beholdenness to the res.
At the same time, however, Bolzano also threatens to eliminate the third aspect from the traditional understanding as well -namely, its essential link to an intellectus, to the mental activity of representers (subjects) like ourselves. We have already seen that Bolzano takes propositions to possess an identity and a structure that is what it is independent of any relation to any actual existent mental activity. In fact, Bolzano thinks that the nature of propositions is also fixed independently from any relation that they might bear to any possible mental activity as well. This can be seen from Bolzano's claim that even if it is true that God can (and does) think every proposition and can (and does) know every truth -and hence, even if it is true that the properties of being thinkable and knowable belong to every proposition and truth as objects, respectively -that even so, the concepts of a proposition and of a truth do not 'include' or 'contain' the concepts of being thinkable and being knowable (cf., WL §23, I.92, and §25, I.113).
Hence, despite the fact that Bolzano himself first introduces these concepts by pointing to their function as the content of subjective representations, he ultimately takes the concept of a proposition and a truth to be both concepts that are intelligible independently There is, however, one very important commitment that Brentano embraced early on and never relinquished, a commitment that -in light of the preceding sections -might seem to be a natural option for someone attempting to avoid the pitfalls of idealism.
Nevertheless, it was a quite radical one, from the traditional perspective of thinking about judgment, especially after Kant. This is Brentano's unfailing rejection of the idea that the copula in judgment consists in, or represents, any sort of combination at all. means to say that a judgment is true is cashed out in terms of the correlation between the affirmation of the existence of the object and the existence of the object itself, and between the denial of existence and non-existence.
Brentano's embrace of this new correlation is stated more directly in a supplement to his 1889 work, On the Origin of Our Moral Knowledge:
The concepts of existence and non-existence are correlatives to the concepts of the truth of (simple) affirmative and negative judgments.
[…] If I say that an affirmative judgment is true or that its object is existent, in both cases I say precisely the same thing.
[…] The assertion of the truth of the judgment, that there is a learned man, is thus the correlate of the assertion of the existence of its object, 'a learned man'. (TE, 39n; 45n) To say 'p is true', where p is affirmative, is to say 'the object represented in p exists', and what makes an affirmative judgment true is the existence of the object, rather than simply the object itself. And, finally, what is true is the judgment expressed by 'p', not its object.
With This new account of truth introduces a compositeness into the 'objects' that are involved in even otherwise simple existential judgments, one that was missing from the point of view of the Psychology. What is more, it introduces a distinction between an object and its being or existence, something the earlier Brentano was loath to do (cf., PES 240; II.89).
Even so, Brentano retains one key feature of his revisionary account of judgment, insisting that whatever compositeness is present in these new correlates (the existence or nonexistence of the object) is still not the result of their having been 'combined' or 'synthesized'
by the mind in judgment, but are simply presented directly before the mind in mere representation, and then affirmed or denied (cf., §30 et seq.; TE 16f; 18f).
In any case, much to many of his students' chagrin, Brentano's own acceptance of these distinct objectual correlates for judgments was short-lived. By the early 1900s, Brentano had become deeply dissatisfied with his new position and reverted back to views much closer to those of the Psychology. The two main vices that were associated with the introduction of these states of correlates were the resulting bloated ontology and the absence of any plausible account of how we could be acquainted with such entities.
Concerning the first, Brentano thinks that embracing such correlates entails the absurd conclusion that 'there are not merely the real things [die realen Dinge], but also their being [Sein] and non-being and a legion, indeed an infinity, of impossibilities' (TE 82; 91):
Anyone who says that, in addition to things, there is the being of things, as well as the non-being of things is also committed to this: in addition to the individual dog, there exists not merely the being of that dog, but also the being of each of its parts, however small, as well as the being of the limits which belong to it as a body…. And then the being of the being of the dog, in turn, would require analogous assumptions. An infinite and entirely unfruitful complication. Yet the adventures one encounters with the non-being of an individual dog -whether one denies or affirms the dog itself -would be even more bizarre. (TE 111; 126) through perception or intuition and mediate apprehension through inference or abstraction.
The first is ruled out of hand: Brentano's arguments against acquiring knowledge of such entia via inference and abstraction are equally quick: it is entirely unclear what premises could yield these entia as inferential conclusions; and abstraction would have the unfortunate consequence that the concept of the being of A would have to be a 'more general concept' than that of A itself, and so somehow include A under itself as a species (TE 108; 122) . Having taken himself to exclude all options, Brentano concludes that no story about our representational access to such objects is forthcoming: 'it appears to be obvious, therefore, that there can be no talk of a representation of the being of A in the proper sense, but instead that it is always only the A that we are representing' (TE 109; 123; my ital.) -with the same thing following for the nonbeing of A as well (cf., TE 112; 128).
By 1904 at the latest, then, Brentano holds, not just that 'there is nothing other than something real', but also that 'nothing other than something real can be thought my ital.) . 24 Yet however compelling the arguments against such entia may be, and however appealing the new austere realist ('reistic') ontology may itself be, Brentano is now faced with making sense of truth, and the relation of making-true -and in particular, in the case of negative existential judgments -while avoiding reference to the very things he previously took to be necessary for such a task. How does Brentano now propose to deal 24 As he indicates in a later manuscript from 1914, what Brentano means by 'real' here, includes things like 'a body, a mind, a topoid of more or fewer than three dimensions' (TC 16; 4), and more generally 'every substance, every plurality of substances, every part of a substance, and also every accident' (TC 19; 11 with truth and falsity, if not in terms of the harmonious correlation, or lack thereof, between the quality of judgment (affirmative or negative) and the being (existence) or non-being of its object?
Brentano's final proposal is, once again, quite radical:
Truth pertains to the judgment of the person who judges correctly [richtig] -i.e., to the judgment of the person who judges about a thing in the way in which anyone whose judgment was made with evidence would judge about the thing; hence it pertains to the judgment of one who asserts what the person who judges with evidence would also assert. (TE 122; 139) Rather than an analysis of truth in terms of the agreement between judgment and object altogether, Brentano now moves toward an analysis in terms of the agreement between a judgment and another judgment -namely, agreement with what is evidently correct to judge.
Instead of consisting in the agreement of a judgment with an object toward which it is intentionally directed, truth is now taken to consist in terms of an agreement with what a judger who sees the evident correctness of his judgment would experience or perceive.
25
Once this step is taken, Brentano now thinks that he can provide a new analysis of negative existential judgments as follows. Brentano argues, first, that concepts like 'the existent' and 'the non-existent' appear to be correctly applied to objects because the object in question is either 'something correctly thought in a positive manner' ('something correctly affirmed') or something correctly thought in a 'negative' manner 79 At this point, however, worries arise that Brentano has eliminated truth from view altogether. We might worry, more specifically, whether such a position runs the risk of sacrificing the idea of the objectivity of truth, of truth's being ultimately object-or factdirected, its being ultimately beholden to the facts involving the objects represented. For
Brentano's late analysis not only prohibits things like facts from playing any interesting role in an account of truth, it ultimately denies that there 'are' any such facts, in 'the proper sense'
of 'being'. To the contrary, Brentano now wishes to take our primitive experience of evidence -experience of a state that we are in, or of a property that we possess, as being correct -as something that provides not just the entry-point for the analysis of truth, but rather a sufficient basis for completely reconstructing its content.
29
It is hard to see how primitive experiences of a sense of correctness alone could do full justice to what motivates all of the familiar appeals to more semantical considerations having to do with successful reference to an object of an intentional act. 30 For with its adverbialist construal of representational content, Brentano's late account threatens to 28 Here there would then be clear affinity between the views of Brentano on evidence and the views of Brentano's contemporary, G.E. Moore, concerning our relation to such 'simple' concepts as 'good' and 'yellow' (cf Moore 1903: § §7-10) . 29 In this respect, Brentano's late account of truth might well be called 'epistemic'; compare (Parsons 2004) . 30 This is more than a little ironic, given the early Brentano's fame for having reintroduced intentionality as a central topic in philosophy.
detach truth entirely from its relation to those objects toward which we otherwise take ourselves to be engaged with, in and through our representations. §5. Husserl and the return of the facts Husserl, for one, came to think that his erstwhile teacher had gone too far at this point. Though Husserl agreed that any account of truth must be intimately linked to our experiences of evident correctness, Husserl also thought that any plausible account of evidence itself simply must recognize a link in the other direction, between truth and the objectivities that were represented in the bearers of truth. In effect, though the connection between truth and intentionality-involving acts by subjects should not be severed along
Bolzanian lines, its preservation should not come at the expense of the facts represented, as
Brentano had. For the latter to be achieved, Husserl saw no better hope than to return to Brentano's middle-period intuitions concerning the need for objective correlates of judgment -despite the challenges posed by Brentano himself.
By the late 1890s, however, it was Bolzano's influence -and in particular, Bolzano's way of drawing the distinction between mental act, logical content ('matter'), and metaphysical object -that pushed Husserl's thought decisively away from Brentano's. At the same time, though, Husserl takes great pains to emphasize that it is not abstraction through generalization. Husserl thinks that Brentano had been right to complain that construing the moves from S to the being of S, the being-P of S, etc., as moves from species to genus is nonsensical. Rather, Husserl takes the requisite act of abstraction to be one in which consists in a form of partition, one in which abstract 'parts' or 'moments' of the whole object are to be 'set into relief [heben heraus]' and 'new objects thereby emerge In this way, Husserl thinks that direct, sensible intuition is something that can go on to 'found' or 'ground' new acts of intuiting which do make present 'new objectivities' that are constituted with just the right sort of (ontological) 'categorial' structure (such as the being-P of S, etc.) to place them in correlation with (logical) propositional structure (such as the predicative structure: S is P). Hence, though it is true (as the late Brentano and Kant had both supposed) that 'intentions containing categorial forms cannot find their fulfillment in mere sensibility', such intentions do, nevertheless, have fulfillment in something that is 'given' or 'intuited' -namely, 'in a sensibility that has been formed [geformte] through categorial acts' (LU VI, II.186; II.477; my ital.). Husserl's name for the exercise of this kind of 'formed' sensibility is 'categorial intuition' (LU VI, II.186; II.478).
On this picture, what the copula ultimately represents -and in true judgments, 'corresponds' to -is not an act of mind at all (early Brentano), nor is it something 'put' into 33 In this respect, Husserl is onto something not unlike the topic of Wittgenstein's discussion of what is involved in 'seeing aspects' of an object. For exploration of this analogy, see (Bell 1990: 107f) .
our representations by an act (Kant) , nor is it simply 'mysteriously' there in the content without representing anything (Bolzano). Rather, just as the middle-period Brentano had intimated, the copula corresponds to something that is genuinely 'out there', something mind-independent and objective, something waiting to be 'given' and so 'fulfill' our judgments about objects:
Not in reflection upon acts of judgment…but in the fulfillments of judgments themselves lies the true origin of the concepts of states of affairs and of being (in the sense of the copula). Not these acts as objects, but in the objects of these acts do we have the foundation for abstraction which enables the realization of these concepts. nothing less than what is represented in the proposition itself. And in its ability to fully reinstate, without qualification, the object-directness of the truth-relation, Husserl sees the notion of categorial intuition as providing, at long last, a genuine escape-route from the legacy of Kantian subjectivist idealism in the theorizing about the nature of truth.
The introduction of categorial intuition also had the further appeal for Husserl of allowing him to account for the experience of evidence or correctness in a way that gives the lie to the late Brentano's claim that this phenomenon possesses absolutely self-sufficient or primitive intelligibility and is that in terms of which truth itself must be explained. Husserl agrees with Brentano that there is an intimate connection between our understanding of With this last stroke, then, Husserl provides us with a position in which all three of the dimensions we initially identified as belonging to the familiar conception of truth -the mind-independent fact-directness of truth (res), the felt sense of correctness or normativity we experience in relation to the truth (adaequatio), and, finally, the truth's link to our mind and its representations (intellectus) -are all accorded a proper place, with none of these dimensions being reduced or eliminated or re-constructed in terms of another. Instead, Husserl proposes a relationship of mutual and necessary correlation, of 'reciprocal sensedependence', between these notions.
For some, like the late Brentano, the ontological cost of this otherwise harmonious position will be too high, insofar as Husserl is asking us to accept that 'there are', in a genuinely objective sense, an infinity of infinitely complex abstracta waiting to be lifted out Whether or not we find such questions well-motivated, it is worth noting, in closing, that, in the ensuing decade, Husserl himself was later moved to pursue an inquiry along just meant, between the experienced sense of the assertion and the experienced state of affairs -this is evidence ' (I.121; I.190) . 36 These are, in fact, just the questions that the neo-Kantian Paul Natorp raises in his review of the Prolegomena to Husserl's Investigations (cf Natorp 1901) .
